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How to draw the line between protected expression and speech that can be 
suppressed because it is likely to cause discrimination is . . . a difficult and 
complex issue. The most obvious way to make this distinction would be to rely 
on the traditional difference between hate speech and ordinary expression, a 
difference that is incorporated into the positive law of many countries. . . . 
Measured by this standard, the Danish cartoons seem to me rather far from 
legally prohibited hate speech. They take a position on issues of obvious public 
moment, but they do not advocate discrimination or oppression or violence; they 
do not threaten; they do not use race epithets or names; they do not attack 
individuals; they do not perpetuate an obvious untruth; they do not portray 
Muslims as without human dignity. They may exacerbate stereotypes and 
exaggerations, but that is not the same as hate speech. That is simply the nature 
of most ideas. 
—Robert Post1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 On September 30, 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 
twelve editorial cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad leading to 
widespread and violent protests both in Denmark and across the Islamic world.2 
The controversy has generated a torrent of commentary seeking to define and 
defend competing conceptions of the normative implications of the affair. For 
some, the controversy has been emblematic of the incommensurable divide in 
democratic societies between the liberal value of free speech on the one hand and 
a religious taboo (the objection to blasphemy) on the other.3 For others, the whole 
affair is better understood in terms of the socio-political context of Muslim 
minorities living in European nation-states and perceived differences between 
“Europe” or “the West” and “Islam”—each conceived as a distinct civilizational 
nomos “championing opposing values: democracy, secularism, liberty, and 
reason on the one side, and on the other the many opposites—tyranny, religion, 
authority, and violence.”4 Still for others, the publication of the cartoons is better 
seen as attributable to increasing Islamophobia and discrimination against 
Muslims in Europe and North America in the wake of September 11 and is 
“reminiscent of the anti-Semitic propaganda leveled at another minority in 
European history.”5 
 
 1. Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 72, 84 
(2007). 
 2. The cartoons portrayed the Prophet Muhammad as, inter alia, a bomb-throwing terrorist and 
suicide bomber. See generally JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (2009). 
 3. Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?, in IS 
CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 64, 64 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009) (noting 
that a series of international events, particularly around Islam, is leading some scholars to posit “an 
incommensurable divide between strong religious beliefs and secular values” and that events such as 
9/11, the ensuing War on Terror, and the rise of religious politics globally are “often seen as further 
evidence of this incommensurability”). 
 4. Talal Asad, Free Speech, Blasphemy and Secular Criticism, in IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, 
INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 20, 21 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009). 
 5. See Mahmood, supra note 3, at 840; see also Tariq Modood, Obstacles to Multicultural 
Integration, 44 INT’L MIGRATION 51, 51–61 (2006); Maleiha Malik, Muslims are Getting the Same Treatment 
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Each of these narratives captures an aspect of what is at stake in the 
controversy. The focus of this Article is narrower. The question addressed is how 
liberal democratic states ought to respond to visible manifestations of hatred, 
especially speech that constitutes incitement to religious hatred. The Article’s 
concern is thus a contested and overlapping normative gray area lying between 
extreme or hate speech on the one hand, and discrimination, hostility, or violence 
on the basis of religion on the other. 
The notion that persons have a right to be free from incitement to religious 
hatred is recognized in the laws of most modern democracies6 and international 
human rights conventions.7 It encounters fierce resistance in American law, 
however, and in the jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution in particular. Conventional constitutional wisdom is that the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses together forbid legal restriction of the kind of 
speech encapsulated by the Danish cartoons. This is for three general reasons. 
First, while the state has a legitimate interest in preventing discrimination 
against Muslims, this objective is distinct from the interest in prohibiting and 
preventing speech that Muslims find offensive. The difficulty with suppressing 
even hateful speech is that this requires a content-based restriction, which, at 
least since the publication of John Stuart Mill’s classic argument in On Liberty, 
has been held to violate free speech as a liberal principle.8 The only ground for 
limiting such speech is the line drawn in Brandenburg v. Ohio of speech which is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action.”9 
Second, contrary to several decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and calls by Islamic states to prevent the “defamation of religions and 
prophets,”10 persons do not have a right not to be insulted in their religious 
beliefs and offensive speech of this kind should not be understood as inhibiting 
the right freely to practice one’s religion. This argument rests on a particular 
account of the right to freedom of religion and belief and a distinctive theory of 
toleration which holds that liberal democracy “does not require toleration in the 
 
as Jews Had a Century Ago, GUARDIAN, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/02/comment.religion1/print (noting parallels 
between characterizations of Muslims in Europe today and Jews in the 1930s: as “religious bigots, 
aliens, and a blight on European civilization”). 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 24. 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 23. 
 8. For Greenawalt, the principle of “no content regulation” (i.e. that some messages should not 
be favored over others) has emerged as a “central doctrine of First Amendment law.” KENT 
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 16 (1995). 
 9. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 10. On the basis that defamation of religions is inconsistent with the right to freedom of 
expression, the Organization of the Islamic Conference has called for “legally-binding” United 
Nations resolutions to “prevent defamation of religion and prophets” and to “render all acts 
whatsoever defaming Islam as ‘offensive acts’ and subject to punishment.” On Eliminating Hatred 
and Prejudice Against Islam, Thirty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Res. No. 26/33-P 
(June 19–21, 2006). Fifty-seven member states of the OIC have had long standing concerns regarding 
the “defamation of religions.” The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has passed resolutions 
annually since 1999 on Combating Defamation of Religions. See Combating Defamation of Religions, 
G.A. Res. 2005/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.6 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2010  1:27:31 PM 
8 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:5 2010 
sense that persons abandon their independent evaluation of the beliefs and ideas 
of others.”11 
Third, by limiting free speech in order to suppress blasphemy, the state 
“loses democratic legitimacy with respect to those who do not believe in the 
truths protected by a law of blasphemy.”12 Implicit in this argument is a 
particular conception of the liberal subject and a particular theory of democracy 
linking free speech to the flourishing of self-government.13 At a deeper level, the 
argument rests on a theory of political legitimacy under which hate speech laws 
are seen to imperil the legitimacy of other legitimate laws against violence and 
discrimination. 
Taking the Danish cartoons controversy as its point of departure, this 
Article interrogates the normative assumptions underlying these conceptions of 
free speech and freedom of religion and considers what such an inquiry reveals 
about both the contingency and particularity of First Amendment law. What is 
silenced or rendered mute when issues such as the Danish cartoons are analyzed 
in this way through the prism of liberal rights? Might international legal norms 
and dominant understandings of the world community complicate the self-
assuredness of liberal assumptions and open up new spaces and divergent 
pathways for navigating difference and responding to the claims of Muslim 
communities? If First Amendment jurisprudence is committed to an account of 
secular liberalism that is no longer able to deny being more than one claim 
among others, how might we take philosophical stock of the confrontation 
between secular-liberal and Muslim-identitarian commitments to such values as 
the freedom from injury to religious feelings or sensibilities? 
In addressing these questions, this Article intervenes in the extant literature 
by suggesting two distinct dialectical moves, each premised on the distinction 
between internal and external reasons in philosophical argument, which have the 
capacity to unsettle the static secular-religious binary and purportedly 
incommensurable divide between liberal and Islamic values discussed above. 
The argument proceeds as follows: What characterizes classical arguments for 
secular liberal principles advanced by thinkers as diverse as Mill, Locke, Kant 
and Rawls is the assumption that there are external reasons that all rational 
people should be bound by, simply in virtue of their rationality. The difficulty is 
that while rationality is a shared human faculty, there are no such uncontested 
external or a priori universal reasons. All reasons appeal, at some level of 
justification, to substantive value commitments and these may or may not be 
shared by persons of divergent religious and cultural backgrounds. As Akeel 
Bilgrami has suggested: 
[I]t won’t do to say that those who are not convinced by secular liberal ideals are 
failing to be illuminated by some clear light of reason. It is a theoretical fallacy to 
declare the opponents of secular liberalism irrational by standards of rationality 
which all rational people accept. Finding them wrong requires finding them 
wrong by the light of some of their own values. This is what I . . . [have] called 
 
 11. Post, supra note 1, at 79–80. 
 12. Id. at 78. 
 13. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE (Harper & Bros. 1960) (1948). 
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“internal” reasons by which one can show them to be wrong, by contrast with 
what . . . is simply unavailable: “external” reasons, which all rational people are 
supposed to accept, not because of any substantive values they hold but because 
these external reasons precisely make no appeal to other substantive values of 
theirs; they make appeal only to their capacities to think rationally.14 
If correct, two important consequences follow. First, classical liberal 
arguments for free speech and freedom of religion are indeed efforts to provide 
external reasons, or even a single principled reason, which all rational people 
should accept. Such arguments must concede, however, that they rely on and 
indeed mask internal reasons which are in turn dependent on substantive value 
commitments. Failure to recognize the limits of rationality by dogmatically 
asserting external reasons in the face of their contestability—the optimistic 
cosmopolitan belief in the “reconcilability of all human values in a single, 
harmonious unity”—can lead only to the illusion, of which Isaiah Berlin once 
spoke, of the possibility of a final solution: the prospect that mankind can be 
made “just and happy and creative and harmonious forever,” for which no price 
is too high to pay.15 
The loss of external reasons, however, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. Unlike external reasons, internal reasons may not be present in all 
persons and thus in cases of disagreement over value commitments we may 
indeed face the dreaded specter of a relativist impasse, i.e. a situation where 
there are no internal reasons two persons can give to each other. A liberal may 
thus agree that free speech is ultimately justified by internal reasons and rests on 
substantive values, but assert that these are the right reasons and values all the 
same. It is only if she has an internal conflict, some other value which is in tension 
with her commitment to free speech, that the liberal will be reachable by 
someone advancing internal reasons that appeal to her liberal values in an effort 
to persuade her to change her mind on some disputed evaluative issue.16 
This Article argues that this is the real importance of the Danish cartoons: 
not what they teach us about Islamic norms and values (although they may do 
this), but rather how they raise unsettling questions regarding core features of 
secular modernity and the place of religion in liberal democratic orders, 
especially in regard to the epistemology of legal categories pertaining to religious 
toleration and value pluralism.17 In much the same way international human 
rights norms provide a critical mirror by which to illuminate certain cultural and 
historical assumptions internal to American constitutional law, and liberal 
theorizing more broadly, that continue to shape and define the contours of the 
 
 14. Akeel Bilgrami, Secularism and Relativism, 31 BOUNDARY 2, Summer 2004, at 173, 175. 
 15. STEVEN LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSITY 90 (2003). 
 16. The principled impasse of relativism is thus conceivable only where “someone with whom 
one is disagreed over values is not merely never inconsistent . . . they would also have to be wholly 
without any tension or dissonance in their values and desires.” Bilgrami, supra note 14, at 186. 
Bilgrami suggests that this would be an “extraordinary condition to find in any value-economy” and 
would require the two parties in a dispute over a value to be “monsters of coherence.” Id. 
 17. See infra Part IV. See generally Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of 
Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 21–25 (2008); Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets 
and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 
292–96 (2008). 
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Religion and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. For such a discussion even 
to begin, however, the two notions of loss of external reasons and existing 
tension or conflict between internal reasons each must be acknowledged. 
Assuming this space for dialogue and contestation can be opened in the 
Self, the second dialectical move involves the question of how to understand and 
interpret the claims of the Other. The first point is to accede that Islamic (and 
other religious) arguments for the restriction of blasphemy (as yet undefined) 
rest on internal reasons and substantive value commitments. But given the 
unavailability of external reasons, this alone provides no reason to reject such 
arguments’ claims to objectivity, toleration, or respect. What has been most 
striking about the Danish cartoons controversy has been how the deep sense of 
injury expressed by so many Muslims at seeing the Prophet Muhammad 
depicted as a terrorist has literally been incomprehensible within Euro-Atlantic 
modernity. Following the work of Saba Mahmood, this Article thus asks what 
constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity in the modern world and 
what practices may be necessary to make this kind of injury of religious pain not 
mute but intelligible within the discourse of liberal rights?18 
Answering these questions requires us to appreciate the difference between 
particular modalities of belief and hermeneutics within distinct religious 
traditions. As observed by Wendy Brown, “[w]ithout an appreciation of this 
difference, the offence and injury that the cartoons caused for many remained 
unarticulated and unrecognized; the debates remained locked in an unreflexive 
and one-sided hermeneutic taken to be the only hermeneutic.”19 This Article’s 
suggestive title “Defaming Muhammad” is thus a gesture to an elusive 
intermediate position reducible to neither defaming Islam qua religion nor 
Muslims qua persons. Such a reflexive hermeneutic becomes intelligible only 
once we appreciate particular Islamic conceptions of devotion and piety and of 
an intimate living relationship of veneration, emulation, and embodied 
habitation that many Muslims have with the Prophet. 
But as before, this is a necessary, not sufficient condition. In order to seek to 
persuade Muslims in evaluative disputes to change their substantive value 
commitments, it is further necessary to advance internal reasons which appeal to 
Islamic values and norms and to pay close attention to how legal restrictions and 
competing conceptions of right seem from the internal point of view of Islam itself. 
As increasingly recognized by leading liberal20 and international human rights21 
 
 18. Mahmood, supra note 3, at 70–71. Mahmood notes that “the motivations for the international 
protests were notoriously heterogeneous, and [that] it is impossible to explain them through a single 
causal narrative.” Id. at 70. Some scholars, for example, have argued that the Muslim reaction to the 
cartoons was more the result of an orchestrated campaign by political actors with vested interests and 
opportunism by Islamic extremists than any spontaneous emotional reaction. See KLAUSEN, supra note 
2. This Article pursues only the narrower question of intelligibility of moral injury. 
 19. Wendy Brown, Introduction, in IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 1, 
17 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN 
DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 13, 14–15 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 
2003) (suggesting that there is no way to say that a “set of permissions is adequate for the practice of 
a religion except by paying attention to how that set of restrictions seems from the internal point of 
view of the religion” and that an “externally stated adequacy condition—which was quite at odds 
with internal conceptions—would be arbitrary and unmotivated”); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
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theorists alike, this is the only viable path for rights discourse and the only way 
to open up new potential fusions of horizons and spaces for dialogue on “the 
irreducible and interrelated problems of equality and culture.”22 
The Article proceeds in three parts. After first setting out the notion of 
incitement to religious hatred in Part I, Part II considers the relationship between 
free speech, group libel, and human dignity and argues that the notion of dignity 
lying at the heart of group defamation laws destabilizes classical accounts of 
freedom of expression. Part III addresses the complex historical and normative 
relationship between free speech and freedom of religion in liberal democratic 
orders and considers the two critical questions of whether the Danish cartoons 
give rise to a genuine conflict of rights and how to understand the notion of 
harm. Part IV then discusses how the analysis in the previous two parts shapes 
competing liberal accounts of religious toleration. The Article concludes by 
reflecting on what a more robust account of reflexive toleration might look like 
premised on notions of mutual justification and peaceful coexistence between rival 
ways of life and recognition of the need to pay attention to how legal restrictions 
seem from the internal point of view of a religious tradition. 
II. GROUP DEFAMATION AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
A. Incitement to Religious Hatred 
The notion of incitement to religious hatred is notoriously difficult to define. 
On the one hand, antidiscrimination law is premised on a right of persons to be 
treated equally in certain spheres of life. On the other hand, hate speech laws are 
directed towards speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of certain 
shared characteristics. There is clearly an overlap between these categories: e.g. 
certain types of hate speech (such as inflammatory political speech) may be said 
to amount to or constitute evidence of discrimination, while certain non-spoken 
discriminatory conduct or behavior (such as cross-burning) may be said to 
amount to hate speech. The leading international human rights treaty describes 
the idea as follows: “Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited 
by law.”23 It is also codified in various forms of hate speech legislation in 
countries around the world, including most Western liberal democracies. As 
recently noted by Jeremy Waldron, this includes 
legislation of the sort you will find in England, Canada, France, Denmark, 
Germany, New Zealand, and in some of the states of Australia, prohibiting 
statements ‘by which a group of people are threatened, insulted or degraded on 
 
PEOPLES 78 (1999) (arguing that the “alternative is a fatalistic cynicism which conceives the good of 
life solely in terms of power”). 
 21. See, e.g., ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION (1990) (arguing 
for acceptance of the concept and content of a human rights regime through internal cultural 
legitimation in an Islamic context). 
 22. James Tully, The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on Multiculturalism, in 
MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY AND ITS CRITICS 102, 104 (Paul Kelly ed., 
2002). 
 23.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 20, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2010  1:27:31 PM 
12 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:5 2010 
account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin,’ or prohibiting attempts to 
incite racial or religious hatred.24 
 In the United States, hate speech legislation of this kind has traditionally 
been held to be unconstitutional.25 The logic of free speech jurisprudence is that 
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”26 This 
idea makes little sense unless individuals can aggressively present their views to 
others—even to those for whom the views are unwelcome or upsetting. The First 
Amendment has thus been held to protect all religious polemic from legal 
sanction—even expression that aims “deliberately and provocatively to assault 
the religious sensibilities of the pious.”27 On this basis, the United States entered 
a reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) stating that Article 20 “does not authorize or require legislation or 
other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and 
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”28 
This stance is generally defended29 in terms of the weight that American 
constitutional law places on free speech—what the Supreme Court in Palko v. 
Connecticut referred to as “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly 
every other form of [freedom].”30 The notion that free speech and freedom of 
conscience are supreme constitutional values is further defended in terms of 
 
 24. Jeremy Waldron, Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School: Why Call Hate Speech Group 
Libel? (Oct. 5–7, 2009) (referring to Article 266b of the Danish Penal Code and an English statute on 
hate speech). 
 25. Interpretation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has historically been 
guided by “principles of facial neutrality that disfavor the government’s use of express content-based 
classifications,” and thus free speech doctrine “only protects expression qua expression, without 
regard for its social meaning to certain audiences or the identity of the speaker.” Murad Hussain, 
Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to 
Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 946–47 (2008) (citing Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, 
Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 293–94 (1991)). Hussain argues that 
this “‘profound individualism’ is shaped by ‘a tendency [in American law] to view groups as mere 
collections of individuals, whose claims are no greater than those of their constituent members.” Id. 
An example of a law held to be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds is R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (overturning a cross-burning conviction under a municipal hate crimes 
ordinance and finding the law facially unconstitutional because prohibiting the use of fighting words 
only “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”). 
 26. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 27. Post, supra note 1, at 73. Post refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut as authority for this proposition. Id. He does note, however, that the First Amendment is 
exceptional in this respect and that in Europe “there is a long history of regulating blasphemy, and as 
a consequence the question of subjecting the cartoons to legal sanction is very much alive.” Id. 
 28. U.S. RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS, INT’L COVENANT ON CIV. AND 
POL. RTS, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992). 
 29. However, on September 25, 2009 the United States and Egypt tabled a draft General 
Assembly resolution on Freedom of Opinion and Expression that, while including no exception for 
“defamation of religions,” provides in paragraph four that the Human Rights Council expresses its 
concern that “incidents of racial and religious intolerance, discrimination and related violence, as well 
as negative stereotyping of religions and racial groups continue to rise around the world, and 
condemns, in this context, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, and urges States to take effective measures, 
consistent with their international human rights obligations, to address and combat such incidents.” 
G.A. Res. Draft, U.N Doc. A/HRC/12/L.14 (Sept. 25, 2009). 
 30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
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deeply entrenched narratives of American exceptionalism and Enlightenment 
accounts of individual freedom, self-realization, and autonomy. The discussion 
that follows seeks to foreground an alternative notion of exceptionalism: one that 
views these narratives as outlier or relativist positions of the disreputable sort31 
that fail to take seriously both particular types of harm and the plurality of 
values at stake, especially in the case of Muslims living in Western democratic 
societies. 
A prominent example of such a narrative is Robert Post’s argument in 
relation to the Danish cartoons that short of speech being directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action (the Brandenburg threshold32), the state does 
not have an interest in prohibiting speech that Muslims find offensive.33 But why 
is incitement to imminent violence the correct standard as opposed to Article 20(2) 
of the ICCPR34 or Section 1 of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (United 
Kingdom),35 which both prohibit speech intended to incite racial or religious 
hatred? Whose harm exactly is at issue here? Is it the harm caused by 
suppressing speech or the harm caused by the speech itself (or both) that should 
be our critical concern? Whose ox exactly is being gored? 
The first point to note is that in Post’s analysis the controversy is not 
portrayed as a conflict between fundamental rights. Rather, the conflict is 
portrayed as between a fundamental right on the one hand—free speech 
understood as a principle essential to modern freedom—and the charge of 
blasphemy on the other. Blasphemy is then portrayed as an archaic and coercive 
religious constraint which the United States (although not European nation-
states) has managed to transcend, but which Islamic states and Muslims still 
cling to in their unwillingness or inability to grasp the supreme value of freedom. 
Post cites in this regard Harry Kalven’s well-known statement that “In America, 
there is no heresy, no blasphemy”36 and reiterates conventional constitutional 
wisdom which holds that speech in public discourse be vigorously protected, 
even speech which intentionally targets religious sensibilities and causes 
emotional pain, distress, and outrage.37 
Thus for Post either (1) the free speech principle alone provides the means 
by which to resolve the controversy or (2) other rights such as to freedom of 
religion or human dignity are simply assumed either (a) to be compatible with 
free speech a priori, or (b) in cases of conflict, to be normatively inferior. This way 
of framing the problem is unhelpful to understanding those who complain about 
blasphemy and to finding peaceful and just means of resolving such conflicts. 
Following the logic of reasoning set out above, the first position must either 
concede its dependence on internal reasons and substantive value commitments 
or risk the charge of obduracy. The second position opens the possibility, 
 
 31. Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 307–08 
(1999) (distinguishing reputable from disreputable forms of cultural relativism). 
 32. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 33. Post, supra note 1, at 82. 
 34. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20(3). 
 35. Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c.1 (Eng.) [hereinafter RRHA]. 
 36. HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (Jamie Kalven ed., 
1988). 
 37. Post, supra note 1, at 73. 
Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2010  1:27:31 PM 
14 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:5 2010 
however, of dialogue on tensions internal to liberal rights discourse between 
competing conceptions of fundamental rights and their normative 
interrelationship. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn. 
B. Free Speech and Blasphemy 
By framing the controversy in terms of a conflict between free speech and 
offense to the religious sensibilities of Muslims, the outcome of Post’s analysis is 
predetermined. Freedom must prevail as against superstition, intolerance, and 
irrationality. There can be no place in a secular liberal society for blasphemy as a 
religious crime—the idea of “treason against God”38—or indeed any laws 
“protecting the respect properly due to God.”39 This argument rests on two 
assumptions: first, that the free speech principle is justified by external or 
universal reasons to which all rational persons should be bound simply in virtue 
of their rationality; second, that Islamic norms requiring the suppression of 
blasphemy are premised on internal or subjective reasons that some persons may 
share and others may not and which therefore cannot impose constraints on the 
rights of others.40 It is the first of these assumptions that is our concern here; the 
second is considered in Part III below. 
As Post rightly notes there are many distinct justifications for protection of 
free speech, arguably the most prominent of which is the argument from 
democratic self-governance.41  Accordingly, “[i]f public policy is to be directed by 
an intelligently informed public opinion . . . [citizens] must be free to express and 
discuss their perspectives on the matters satirized in the Jyllands-Posten 
cartoons.”42 What is critical to appreciate is that, despite appealing to no 
substantive moral or political values in its premises, such classical liberal 
arguments regarding non-interference in the lives of citizens depend upon 
essentially-contested propositions regarding the nature of truth and progress. It 
is not possible here to explain in full how such abstract, externally-stated 
propositions rest on internal reasons and substantive value commitments. But for 
present purposes, Bilgrami’s incisive critique of John Stuart Mill’s meta-inductive 
argument for free speech illustrates the point. 
For Bilgrami, Mill’s argument in On Liberty has two premises: “(1) our own 
past opinions have been wrong, and (2) our present opinions may therefore also 
 
 38. See LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY 
(1981). 
 39. Post, supra note 1, at 77. 
 40. It is important to note, as explained by Asad, that “blasphemy” strictly speaking is a category 
which defines an “outrageous ‘religious’ transgression in the Christian tradition.” Asad, supra note 4, 
at 37. The theological term tajdīf is often translated in English to mean “blasphemy,” but in Arabic it 
has the sense of “scoffing at God’s bounty.” Id. at 38. Like similar words such as kufr (“apostasy, 
blasphemy, infidelity”); ridda (“apostasy”); fisq (“moral depravity”); and ilhād (“heresy, apostasy”), 
these terms overlap but are not synonymous with the English term blasphemy. Id. They also do not 
apply to non-Muslims and thus were not used by Arabic speakers in response to the Danish cartoons. 
Id. Rather, the World Union of Muslim scholars used the word isā’ah which has a range of meanings 
including “insult, harm and offense” that apply in secular contexts. Id. In seeking to understand the 
nature, scope, and justifications of the constraints imposed by Islamic norms, it is critical to 
appreciate these distinctions. I am grateful to Saba Mahmood for discussion on this point. 
 41. Post, supra note 1, at 73. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 42. Post, supra note 1, at 77. 
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be wrong, despite our conviction in them. From these premises [Mill’s argument] 
concludes (3) that we should tolerate dissent against our current opinions just in 
case they are wrong and the dissenting opinion is right.”43 The basic facts of past 
error and current epistemic fallibility are things that any rational person will 
accept and lead inexorably to the evaluative conclusion that all dissenting 
opinions should be tolerated because they might be true. But as Bilgrami acutely 
observes, the first premise (that our past opinions have been wrong) is stated 
from the point of view of our present opinions. How then can we “be diffident in 
holding our present opinions in the way that the second premise requires us to 
be”? We may well be diffident about our present opinions, but to that extent “the 
first premise is that much shakier than Mill presents it.”44 
What if we say instead that Mill’s argument does not require us to be 
skeptical regarding all our current beliefs; that in fact we “make epistemological 
progress, and cumulatively build up on a fund of truths via rejecting past 
convictions in the course of the history of inquiry;” and thus we can at least have 
confidence “in our current judgments about our past beliefs being false.”45 Again, 
however, this maneuver is unable to rescue Mill’s argument from its non-
credible epistemology. The underlying difficulty is that the “pervasive diffidence 
which we are supposed to have in our opinions . . . is due to a conception of truth 
which has it that we can never know when we have achieved the truth for any belief.”46 
Mill’s argument for free speech in this way requires us to accept that we 
should seek the Truth, but that we can never be confident we have attained what 
we epistemologically seek.47 There is a deep tension between these two 
propositions, a tension to which the sheer fact of being rational provides no 
apparent solution without appealing to further substantive moral or political 
values such as the virtues of a society characterized by a diversity of opinion.48 
But having acknowledged this, we are now in the sphere of internal reasons 
which opens up space for dialogue on substantive values and justifications for 
tolerating different dissenting opinions.49 As a conceptual matter, the argument 
for publishing the cartoons now stands on the same normative ground as the 
 
 43. Bilgrami, supra note 14, at 177. 
 44. Id. at 178. 
 45. If there are beliefs whose truth epistemic progress via falsification allows confidence, then to 
that extent free speech need not be necessary—at least regarding them. But Mill will not permit any 
exceptions to free speech for some beliefs. He will not allow, for example, that our convictions (now 
held with confidence) that certain beliefs are false are immune from his conclusion about tolerance 
and free speech. Id. at 179. 
 46. Id. at 179–80. 
 47. The argument is not that we cannot attain the truth; only that we cannot ever know that we 
have attained it. One could then relinquish truth as a goal of inquiry and seek something less than the 
truth. But as Bilgrami notes, “[i]f truth, the property of beliefs we never are confident we have 
achieved, is no longer a goal of inquiry, if it is replaced by something weaker which we can be 
confident of having achieved when we have achieved it, then Mill loses his premises altogether.” Id. 
at 181. 
 48. Id. 
 49. On the basis of value-based reasoning and international and comparative legal analysis, 
Waldron thus reaches the conclusion that the content-based restriction doctrine is a “blind-alley” and 
example of “path-dependency” in First Amendment jurisprudence. Jeremy Waldron, Holmes 
Lectures at Harvard Law School: Libel and Legitimacy (Oct. 5–7, 2009). 
Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2010  1:27:31 PM 
16 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:5 2010 
argument for suppressing their publication. A further set of arguments is needed 
for the inquiry to continue. 
C. Group Libel and Human Dignity 
Before turning to the complex issues of religious piety and sanctity and 
whether substantive values of this kind are properly protected by the right to 
freedom of religion and belief, we are yet to address the question raised above: 
Whose harm exactly is at issue here? Post is surely correct that suppressing 
provocative and polemical speech targeting the religious sensibilities of the pious 
may cause harm to speakers by limiting their liberty and restricting the diversity 
and vibrancy of opinions in society. Even if we concede this, however, what 
about the harm which such speech may cause to its targets? How does this harm 
factor into a liberal algebra of individual rights? 
Here we can see the kind of tension internal to secular liberalism to which 
Bilgrami alludes. Individual liberty is not the only substantive value at stake. 
There is at least one other important justification for suppressing speech which 
may not rise to the level of inciting imminent violence but nonetheless seeks to 
stir up religious hatred: the notion of human dignity and the need to protect 
social groups from certain forms of group libel or defamation. As Waldron has 
argued, legal restrictions on hate speech 
are not restrictions on thinking; they are restrictions on more tangible forms of 
message. The issue is publication and the harm done to individuals and groups 
through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public and semi-
permanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the 
community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of 
equal citizenship.50 
Germany’s penal code thus prohibits attacks on human dignity by insulting, 
maliciously maligning, or defaming part of the population.51 A specific French 
provision prohibits defamation of groups.52 The Canadian province of Manitoba 
has a defamation statute which proscribes the “publication of a libel against a 
race, religious creed, or sexual orientation.”53 British laws forbid the expression 
of racial or religious hatred.54 And Australian federal legislation prohibits actions 
that insult, humiliate, or intimidate a group of people because of their race, color, 
or national or ethnic origin.55 
 
 50. Waldron, supra note 24, at 5. 
 51. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 945, § 130(1)(2). See also 
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1181 
(2004). 
 52. Loi nº 81-637 du 29 juillet 1881, art. 29 (prohibiting group and individual defamation). 
 53. Defamation Act, R.S.M., ch. D 20 (1987) (prohibiting “[t]he publication of a libel against a 
race, religious creed or sexual orientation, likely to expose persons belonging to the race, professing 
the religious creed, or having the sexual orientation to hatred, contempt or ridicule, and tending to 
raise unrest or disorder among the people”). 
 54. The Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64 § 18 (Eng.). 
 55. Racial Hatred Act, 1995 (Cth.). See also The Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, s 1 
(VIC) (noting that vilifying conduct diminishes the “dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the 
community” of individuals and groups and is contradictory to the principle of democracy). 
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In the United States, the Supreme Court upheld the idea of group libel in 
1952 in Beauharnais v. Illinois.56 In addition, various states have historically 
enacted group libel statutes in their criminal codes proscribing the holding up to 
ridicule, hatred, or contempt any group or class of people because of their race, 
color, or religion.57 Since the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times v. 
Sullivan58 and ensuing cases, however, the status of Beauharnais and the whole 
notion of group libel as an exception to protected speech under the First 
Amendment has been in doubt.59 
For Waldron, the key to understanding the notion of group defamation lies 
in the concept of the dignity of the persons affected—dignity “in the sense of their 
basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as social equals and as bearers 
of human rights and constitutional entitlements.”60 A well-ordered democratic 
state must be concerned with upholding and vindicating important aspects of the 
legal and social status of its citizens. Thus, laws regarding group libel are set up 
to “vindicate public order, not just by preempting violence, but by upholding 
against attack a shared, public sense of the basic elements of each person’s status, 
dignity, and reputation as a citizen or member of society—particularly against 
attacks predicated upon the characteristics of some particular social group.”61 
While laws against racial or religious defamation are framed in terms of group 
reputation, they are not ultimately concerned with groups per se, but rather with 
the basic social standing of individual members of groups. In this respect, the 
concern is ultimately individualistic: such laws “look instead to the basics of 
social standing and to the association that is made . . . between the denigration of 
that social standing and some characteristic associated more or less ascriptively 
with the group.”62 
Waldron agrees with Post that while offense and dignity are closely related 
and often entangled in complex ways when a racial or religious group is 
hatefully denigrated, they are not the same thing. He thus supports Post’s claim 
that deeply offensive, distressing and even assaultive speech may justifiably be 
protected in a well-ordered democracy.63  But this alone does not end the inquiry. 
It does not answer, for example, the question of whether visible manifestations of 
 
 56. 343 U.S. 250, 251, 267 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the 
publication or exhibition of any writing or picture portraying the “depravity, criminality, unchastity, 
or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion”). 
 57. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-1 (1961); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 98c (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510 (1979). See 
also Kenneth Lasson, In Defense of Group-Libel Laws, or Why the First Amendment Should Not Protect 
Nazis, 2 HUM. RTS. ANN. 289, 298 (1985). 
 58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 59. But cf. Waldron, supra note 24, at 19 (arguing that “it is not at all clear why the reasoning in 
New York Times v. Sullivan should protect the defendant in the Beauharnais case”). 
 60. Id. at 15. 
 61. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Thus, “[m]embers may belong ascriptively to a group by virtue of 
some shared characteristics: race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, and national origin.” Id. at 14. 
In this respect, group defamation “sets out to make [group membership] a liability by denigrating 
group-defining characteristics or associating them with bigoted factual claims that are fundamentally 
defamatory. A prohibition on group defamation, then, is a way of blocking that enterprise.” Id. at 16. 
 63. See infra Part III.D. 
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hatred directed towards racial and religious groups (especially vulnerable 
minorities) should be suppressed on the grounds of vindicating a basic 
conception of public order premised on the equal dignity and status of persons. 
Entirely internal to liberal argument, Waldron’s notion of dignity as lying at 
the core of group defamation laws destabilizes Post’s one-sided framing of the 
cartoons controversy. Waldron shows, persuasively in my view, why the free 
speech principle may need to be limited in certain circumstances, and why 
dignity and the rights and freedoms of others may provide a sufficient and 
necessary justification to do so. Whether the Danish cartoons meet this threshold 
may be doubted.64 But the critical issue is how we understand and give meaning 
to notions of “dignity” and the “rights and freedoms of others,” especially in this 
context the right to freedom of religion and belief. It is to these questions we can 
now turn. 
III.  FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF 
The discussion in Part II argues that it is a conceptual error to view the 
suppression of blasphemy and speech inciting religious hatred more generally 
solely in terms of the threat they may pose to the freedom of individual speakers. 
Blasphemy, for example, may also be viewed as violence done to deeply valued 
human relations and thus to the limits that define particular kinds of freedom. 
The difficulty, as Talal Asad has observed, is that 
[a]ngry Muslim responses to the publication of the Danish cartoons are seen by 
secularists as attempting to reintroduce a category that was once a means of 
oppression in Europe, while they see themselves critiquing, in the name of 
freedom, the power to suppress human freedom. For the worldly critic, there can 
be no acceptable taboos. When limits are critiqued, taboos disappear and 
freedom is expanded.65 
The word freedom is doing a great deal of work here and needs carefully to 
be unpacked. The first puzzle concerns justified limits on the free speech 
principle. In First Amendment jurisprudence, limitations are well-accepted: laws 
and judicial decisions relating to fighting words, defamatory speech, obscenity, 
and indecency; laws relating to child pornography; and copyright and patent 
laws all impose restrictions on freedom of expression.66 It is thus not the 
constraint per se that seems intolerable, but rather the reasons for, and terms in 
which, the constraint is articulated. What does this particular array of restrictions 
and configuration of free speech doctrine tell us about liberal conceptions of 
human freedom? 
 
 64. For Waldron, exercise of the right to publish the cartoons by the editors of Jyllands-Posten 
was “fatuous, unnecessary and offensive” but the cartoons “make some sort of twisted contribution . 
. . and I believe they should be tolerated as such.” Waldron, supra note 49, at 16; cf. Geert Wilders, 
Party for Freedom, Contribution to the Parliamentary Debate on Islamic Activism, http:// 
www.geertwilders.nl/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1214 (comparing the Qur’an 
to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and the film Fitna (meaning “strife” in Arabic), which juxtaposes Quranic 
verses with images of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks). 
 65. Asad, supra note 4, at 55. 
 66. See, e.g., William van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 
121–25 (1982) (noting that the category of “‘the’ freedom of speech” does not include perjury, 
obscenity, defamation, fighting words, commercial fraud, criminal solicitation, etc.). 
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In order to answer this question, we need to understand the rise of the 
liberal democratic state and secular modernity in the West and, in particular, 
how the conceptual separation between public and private functions in liberal 
theory. This is a formidable task, one well beyond the scope of this Article. For 
present purposes, let me offer just a few observations. 
A. The Public/Private Divide 
The defining ideas of the liberal state are neutrality and a putative 
public/private divide. Religion is seen as separated from the state and properly 
understood to be within the private sphere. This leaves a “neutral” public sphere 
that seeks to maintain its neutrality through rigorous commitment to a scheme of 
individual rights. The state may thus have no cultural or religious projects or 
indeed any collective goals of its own beyond the protection of the liberty and 
security of its citizens. 
These distinctions are often traced historically to the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment. It was Immanuel Kant who in 1795 famously distinguished 
between the public and private uses of reason: the idea that reason must be 
“free” in its public use (aude sapere exercised in “broad daylight”) and 
“submissive” in its private use (the subjection of reason to the particular ends in 
view).67 But as Michel Foucault observed, this is “term for term, the opposite of 
what is ordinarily called freedom of conscience.”68 Two centuries later, we see 
the private sphere as a space of non-interference from state and religious 
authority while the public sphere is viewed as a space where rationalism itself 
imposes limits and constraints on freedom of thought, conscience, and speech—
what Foucault refers to as Kant’s “contract of rational despotism with free 
reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee 
of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle that must be obeyed 
itself be in conformity with universal reason.”69 
Here we see perhaps the defining effort in modernity to use external 
reasons to justify liberal notions of autonomy (the “public and free use of 
autonomous reason”), neutrality (the “political principle”), and right (“universal 
reason”) so as to bind all rational people simply in virtue of their rationality. The 
difficulty is that each of these notions inexorably rest, and depend for their 
coherence, upon distinctive and contingent internal reasons and substantive 
values. The liberal-autonomous subject remains in part a religious subject, but 
only in the private sphere where religion is tacitly assumed or (re)defined in 
Protestant terms to take the form of private “belief or conscience.” As noted 
above, the neutrality of the state then simultaneously mediates and circumscribes 
this private sphere though a scheme of individual rights and the right to freedom 
of religion and belief in particular. And the notion of secular or universal right is 
encompassed in the categorical rationalism of the liberal algebra itself: “Act 
 
 67. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in WHAT IS 
ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS (James 
Schmidt ed., 1996). 
 68. Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32 (Paul Rabinow ed., 
1984). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
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externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the 
freedom of everyone according to a universal law.”70 
Each of these propositions involve fraught and contested claims that in 
effect define Enlightenment as the discovery of an exit, a “way out,” a “process 
that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’” (i.e. from a state where religious 
authority takes the place of our conscience) by a “modification of the preexisting 
relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason.”71 The consequences of 
these complex moves for secular liberalism are well-described by Saba 
Mahmood: 
[C]ontrary to the ideological self-understanding of secularism (as the doctrinal 
separation of religion and state), secularism has historically entailed the 
regulation and re-formation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices to yield 
a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in 
its contours). Historically speaking, the secular state has not simply cordoned off 
religion from its regulatory ambitions but sought to remake it through the 
agency of the law. This remaking is shot through with tensions and paradoxes 
that cannot simply be attributed to the intransigency of religionists (Muslims or 
Christians).72 
Mahmood notes that under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
courts constantly need to distinguish and decide which manifestations of 
religious belief to recognize and accommodate when conflicts arise with “neutral 
laws of general application.”73 
A further consequence for liberal theory is the so-called “mind-action” 
distinction which forms a core premise in liberal rights discourse. This applies as 
much to claims of free speech as to freedom of religion. Freedom of thought and 
conscience are each considered to be absolutely protected from interference by the 
law, i.e. non-derogable and not subject to limitation.74 The right to manifest one’s 
 
 70. Waldron, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
 71. The idea that metaphysics was a “premise derived from another source” led to Kant’s 
statement that “he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith.” Pope Benedict XVI, 
Address at University of Resenburg, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections 
(Sept. 12, 2006). The result was that he “anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it 
access to reality as a whole.” Id. 
 72. Mahmood, supra note 3, at 87. In this respect, the process of democratic self-government and 
space of public debate can be seen not simply as a space of expression and rational deliberation but of 
formation in which “both coercive, regulatory, and rhetorical power is necessary in order to produce 
the right kind of citizen subject who can inhabit the norms of a liberal democratic polity. Contra Post, 
the public sphere is not simply a domain of unhindered communication, but also a disciplinary space 
that inhibits certain kinds of speech while enabling others, equipping people to hear specific types of 
arguments while remaining deaf to others.” Saba Mahmood, Comments by Saba Mahmood on the Una’s 
Lecture: Religion and Freedom of Speech, http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/pubs/ 
post_mahmood.pdf (emphasis added). 
 73. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2007) 
(analyzing the unsuccessful struggle of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish families to preserve the 
practice of placing religious artifacts such as crosses and stars of David on the graves of a city-owned 
burial ground). 
 74. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20. Article 18(2) of the ICCPR provides that no person “shall be 
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice.” Id. art. 18(2). The state, for example, is absolutely prohibited from proscribing membership of 
certain religions under law; from coercing individuals to reveal their religion without consent; or 
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thought or conscience in the form of speech or other action is, however, subject to 
reasonable limitation by the state on certain specified grounds. There is a rich 
jurisprudence at the domestic and international levels dealing with the fragile 
and unstable divide between thought and conscience on the one hand, and action 
related to belief on the other.75 
We have seen above how hate speech laws, which impose limits on the 
“public and free use of autonomous reason,” are thus justified on the dual 
premises that (1) they leave the forum internum of thought and conscience 
undisturbed, and (2) impose restrictions on speech only to the extent necessary to 
protect the autonomy and dignity of others from visible manifestations of hatred. 
Interestingly, Islamic law makes a similar distinction to justify the suppression of 
blasphemy. It is a central tenet of Islam that there may be no coercion in matters 
of religion.76 In Islamic law, Muslims remain free to believe whatever they wish 
in matters of religious or other belief.77 Laws proscribing blasphemy limit only 
the extent to which those beliefs can be publically acted upon in relation to the 
rights and freedoms of other Muslims. There is a different normative 
understanding, however, of the public sphere and of how religion and religious 
belonging to a particular way of life (as distinct from religious belief per se) define 
the limits and contours of political toleration. 
On this understanding, blasphemy is not concerned so much with the 
challenge of a new truth as “something that seeks to disrupt a living 
relationship.”78 In this respect, Sharia does restrict the individual right to behave 
as one wishes in public, but any notion of separation between “public” and 
“private” spheres is differently understood than in the idealized liberal state. 
Morality is not regarded solely as a private matter. In addition to what liberal 
theory accepts as “time, manner, and place” restrictions in the public sphere, 
religious morality and piety are accepted as imposing norms of appropriate 
speech and behavior on the individual while, conversely, the “breaching of 
‘private’ domains is disallowed in Islamic law.”79 In this sense, “the limits of 
 
from using threats, physical force, or penal sanctions to compel individuals to adhere or recant to 
certain religious beliefs. See BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF—ENSURING 
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 26 (1996). 
 75. For discussion of cases involving the belief-action distinction in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights see Peter Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of The 
European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192 (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 
2002); see also CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 74–79 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of the internal/external dichotomy in 
European Court of Human Rights case law). 
 76. The Holy Qur’an 2:256 (“There is no compulsion in religion”); Id. 18:29 (“let him who wills 
have faith, and him who wills reject it”). 
 77. Asad, supra note 4, at 39–40 (citing MUHAMMAD SALIM AL-‘AWWA, AL-HAQ FI AL-TA‘BĪR (THE 
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH) 23 (1998) (arguing that in the sharia “[f]reedom of belief means the right of 
every human being to embrace whatever ideas and doctrines he wishes, even if they conflict with 
those of the group in which he lives or to which he belongs, or conflicts with what the majority of its 
members regard as true”)). 
 78. Asad thus notes that the “passionate reaction to ‘blasphemers’ is typically directed not at the 
latter’s disbelief but at their alleged violence.” Asad, supra note 4, at 27. 
 79. Asad, supra note 4, at 17. As Asad acutely observes, the extent of legal regulation and 
intervention into “domestic space” has expanded exponentially in the liberal welfare state as the 
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freedom are differently articulated in relation to spaces that may roughly be 
described as ‘private’ and ‘public,’ and different kinds of discourse are socially 
available to distance what is repugnant, whether transcendent or worldly.”80 We 
will never understand blasphemy if all we see in it is a threat to freedom as 
opposed to a competing conception of freedom developed according to a different 
understanding of the interrelationship between individual freedom and social 
order. 
B. Public Order 
 If the static external/internal dichotomy between free speech and 
blasphemy is relinquished, how then should we understand laws which impose 
restrictions on certain types of speech or incitement involving religion or belief 
whether in European or Islamic states or elsewhere? Whether limits are imposed 
on blasphemy, incitement to religious hatred, group libel, or defamation of 
religion (each overlapping and raising complex and variegated questions of their 
own), can such laws be viewed in certain contexts as seeking to vindicate public 
order by upholding against attack a shared sense of the basic elements of status, 
dignity, and reputation of members of a society? 
In order to address this question, let us consider briefly recent debates and 
reform efforts in the United Kingdom. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
British Government introduced the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 
which sought inter alia to amend the Public Order Act 1986 to extend its 
provisions on incitement to racial hatred to include incitement to religious 
hatred.81 The effort failed in the House of Lords, but in 2005 the Government 
reintroduced the Bill and Parliament finally enacted the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 which creates a new offense of stirring up hatred against 
persons on religious grounds.82 Two years later, on May 8, 2008, the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 abolished the common law offences of 
blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales.83 
 
boundaries of the citizen’s right to privacy, “on which her moral and civic freedom rests,” have been 
significantly redrawn by “public” law to authorize ever more bureaucratic action in (formerly) 
“private” domains. Id. at 36–37. 
 80. Id. at 37. 
 81. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 2001, H.C. Bill [49] (Eng.). For discussion, see 
Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to September 
11?, 65 MODERN L.R. 724 (2002). 
 82. Religious hatred is defined in section 29A as “hatred against a group of persons defined by 
reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.” RRHA, supra note 35, c.1, § 29A. The offense is 
defined in Section 29B in terms of a “person who uses threatening words or behavior, or displays any 
written material which is threatening . . . if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred.” Id. § 29B. 
For present purposes, it is important to note that section 29J of the Act expressly excludes 
“discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular 
religions or the beliefs and practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or 
practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system 
to cease practicing their religion or belief system.” Id. § 29J. See infra Part III.D for discussion of the 
distinction between group libel and offense. 
 83. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 79 (Eng.). 
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Prior to their abolition, these offences extended only to the Church of 
England and in certain respects to Christianity as a whole.84 The offenses had 
consistently been upheld against challenge not only in the English courts, but 
also in the European Court and Commission of Human Rights as being both non-
discriminatory and compatible with the right to free speech under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).85 But in recognition of increasing 
Islamophobia and hostility towards Muslims and in light of longstanding calls 
by reform bodies to abolish or amend the law relating to religious offenses, they 
became subject to review by a House of Lords Select Committee during the 2003 
debate over whether to introduce a new offence of incitement to religious hatred 
which would have the effect of extending the law’s protection to Britain’s Islamic 
and other religious communities.86 Interestingly, after an exhaustive debate the 
Committee was unable to make any specific recommendations failing to 
recommend either abolition of existing blasphemy laws or the creation of a new 
offense of incitement to religious hatred. 
As Ian Hunter notes, the underlying problem was the apparent 
incompatibility between the language of the ECHR and the terms in which 
European political and legal orders have historically dealt with the problems of 
sectarian conflict and religious freedom. 
As the inheritors of these settlements, liberal political and legal orders are not 
involved in the game of balancing potentially conflicting rights, but in the quite 
different task of adjusting degrees of freedom (whether of speech or religion) in 
light of an assessment of the likely threats to personal and state security arising.87 
The Committee thus acknowledged that its judgments must be informed by 
the need to ensure continued stability, tranquility, and mutual tolerance between 
major religious groups and secular segments of society, and equality of 
 
 84. In R. v. Lemon [1979] 1 All E.R. 898, 921–22, Lord Scarman criticized blasphemous libel at 
common law on the grounds that it did not extend to “protect the religious beliefs and feelings of 
non-Christians” (which was necessary in an “increasingly plural society such as that of modern 
Britain”) but rather belonged to a “group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the internal 
tranquility of the kingdom.” The rationale for the limited scope of the offences is related to the 
historical relationship between the state and nation (which is dominantly Protestant) in Britain. 
 85. See Gay News Ltd. v. U.K., 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1983) (upholding the prosecution of a 
British magazine for publishing a poem found to be blasphemous to Christians because the “main 
purpose” of the English common law offense of blasphemous libel is “to protect the rights of citizens 
not to be offended in their religious feelings”); Choudhury v. U.K., 12 H.R.L.J. 172 (1991) (declaring 
an application contending that English law was prejudicial against Islam inadmissible because there 
was no positive obligation on states under the Convention to protect all religious sensibilities); 
Wingrove v. U.K., 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1996) (upholding the British government’s refusal to permit 
circulation of a film found to be offensive to Christian sensibilities because the government had the 
legitimate aim to “protect[] the rights of others”); Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H. 
R. 56 (ser. A) (1994) (upholding the Austrian government’s seizure of a film on the basis that it 
constituted an attack on the Christian religion and Roman Catholicism in particular and concurring 
that the government “acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people 
should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.”). 
 86. See HOUSE OF LORDS, RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES - FIRST REPORT, 2003. 
 87. Ian Hunter, Religious Offenses and Liberal Politics: From the Religious Settlements to Multi-
Cultural Society (unpublished manuscript at 15, on file with author). 
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protection from intolerance on the basis of belief or no belief.88 But not only was 
there no apparent way of reconciling this conception of toleration with the liberal 
algebra of rights, this approach also appeared to contradict the traditional 
conception of England as a “state whose church is part of its constitution” where 
“religious belief continues to be a significant component or even determinant of 
social values” and thus a state that should “have the role of embodying the 
religious identities of its constituent communities.”89 Caught between the three 
positions of needing to (1) maintain religious peace, (2) respect universal human 
rights, and (3) protect the religious freedom and cultural identity of the nation, 
the Committee was paralyzed in a remarkable situation where “the actual 
organization of the liberal political and juridical order remain[ed] out of reach of 
a central mode of modern moral reflection.”90 
The point of this analysis is to suggest that, in contrast to the claims of 
classical liberal theory, laws imposing limitations on blasphemy or incitement to 
religious hatred may not necessarily be inconsistent with either conceptions of 
human rights in international law or the public law of modern liberal democratic 
orders. The more interesting question is why blasphemy laws have progressively 
lost their basis in sacrilege and assumed instead the form of public order offences 
in the secular nomos of modern Europe, and why conversely these laws have 
assumed neither of these forms in the United States. If the analysis above is 
correct, then the answer lies in the history of competing conceptions of the 
public/private divide,91 the role of religion in general and Christianity in 
particular in imagining and realizing that divide,92 and how these legal and 
 
 88. SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT, 2002–3, H.L. 
95–I, at 7. 
 89. Hunter, supra note 87, at 17. 
 90. Id. at 16. 
 91. There is an important historical difference between the United States and United Kingdom 
on the question of establishment of religion. In the United States, the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment notion of non-establishment is entrenched as an express constitutional norm, whereas 
in the United Kingdom the Church of England remains established within an older tradition of 
common law constitutionalism. 
 92. Hans Kohn first made the distinction between territorial-civic and ethnocultural nationalism, 
the former conceived as a political movement to limit governmental power and secure civic rights 
that developed during the Enlightenment, the latter conceived as based on an older conception of the 
nation as the product of objective facts pertaining to social life. HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS 
MEANING AND HISTORY 29–30 (1955). The United States and United Kingdom can be viewed again as 
competing examples of the relationship between liberalism and nationalism, the former conceived in 
an immigrant conception as an “association of citizens” committed to the abstract ideals of liberty, 
equality, and republicanism and not based on any single nationality, the latter conceived as a 
traditional “nation-state” where a single national or collective identity (shaped in part by a dominant 
religion) defines the public sphere. See Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of 
Religious Freedom in International Law, supra note 17, at 30–33. Given these different historical 
trajectories, it is unsurprising that in the United States while the “logic of blasphemous libel required 
courts to find ways of seeing the churches or Christianity in general as indispensible supports of 
government . . . . [b]y the middle of the nineteenth century, American courts found themselves 
unable to do this, and they struck down prosecutions for blasphemy not on free speech but on anti-
establishment grounds. Since Christianity could no longer be seen as part of the organized apparatus 
of social control, then vulnerable or not, it would just have to fend for itself in the unruly marketplace 
of sacred and profane ideas.” Waldron, supra note 24, at 20. 
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political philosophies have generated competing conceptions of pluralism and 
toleration in the liberal state.93 
C. Conflicts of Rights 
While blasphemy laws may be understood in this way as protecting dignity 
and public order, they may also be defended in terms of protecting the right to 
freedom of religion and belief itself. On this approach, the difficulty we confront 
is not a supposed conflict between a right (free speech) and an oppressive 
conception of the good (blasphemy), but rather a genuine conflict of fundamental 
rights and thus internal to the question of right itself. 
The critical point here is that freedom of thought, conscience, and 
expression, justified on Enlightenment-rationalist and secular-modernist 
grounds, is the dominant value in liberal theory. There are two major difficulties 
with this approach. First, as a normative matter, why exactly should free speech 
take precedence over respect for religions and the right to freedom of religion 
and belief? Nothing in the ICCPR supports the view that Article 19 is 
hierarchically superior to Article 18. Conversely, Article 20(2) in fact requires 
states to prohibit by law advocacy of religious hatred rising to the level of 
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.94 
Second, freedom of religion is compatible with this view only to the extent it 
encompasses an inviolable private or inner realm of “belief” or “conscience”—
the so-called forum internum discussed previously—separate from manifestations 
of that belief.95 On this view, you may believe in any prophet or religion you 
wish, provided you don’t manifest your beliefs in such a way as to restrict the 
rights of others to believe (or not to believe) or express (or not to express) 
themselves as they choose. The difficulty with this argument is that it relies on a 
prior assumption which equates religion with belief or conscience. As Michael 
Sandel has argued, this conception connects the case for religious liberty and 
state neutrality with a liberal conception of the person whereby the right is 
conceived as prior to the good and the self as prior to its ends, i.e. the argument 
seeks its justification in the realm of external reasons: 
It holds that government should be neutral toward religion in order to respect 
persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their religious 
convictions for themselves. The respect this neutrality commands is not, strictly 
speaking, respect for religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or 
 
 93. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 27–30 (1992) (noting the  
distinction between “New World” and “Old World” pluralism, the former premised on the 
nondiscrimination principle in the context of a dominantly immigrant society, the latter premised on 
situated cultural and religious majority and minority groups territorially concentrated in historic 
territories). 
 94. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20(2). 
 95. The point is not that free exercise of religion is not protected, but that the scope of limitations 
on the manifestation of religious beliefs will depend on the theory of religious toleration employed. 
Note, for example, the uncertainty following the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith regarding the scope of religious toleration in cases involving the enforcement of formally 
neutral, general laws that burden the free exercise of religion. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see, e.g., Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). The critical question is the extent to 
which the state recognizes a limited sphere of collective autonomy. 
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respect for the dignity that consists in the capacity to choose one’s religion freely. 
Religious beliefs are “worthy of respect”, not in virtue of what they are beliefs in, 
but rather in virtue of being “the product of free and voluntary choice”, in virtue 
of being beliefs of a self unencumbered by convictions antecedent to choice.96 
The equation of religion with conscience is the end result of the attempt to 
resolve a deep and enduring puzzle in Enlightenment philosophical thought. 
How was the state to be neutral between religion and non-religion while at the 
same time accord religion special protection? As noted by Andrew Koppelman, 
“‘[c]onscience’ promises a way out of this dilemma by describing the basis of free 
exercise [of religion] in a way that specifies only the internal psychology of the 
person exempted, without endorsing any claims about religious truth.”97 The 
power of the argument is that prima facie it avoids appealing to any particular 
substantive moral or political values in its premises. But here we meet two 
critical objections. 
First, why should persons from widely divergent religious and cultural 
traditions accept the proposition that only conscience and not religion per se is 
the proper object of liberal toleration? Outside of Euro-Atlantic modernity, 
where religion and state have entirely different historical configurations, and 
where religious identities define differences between majority and minority 
groups and entire ways of life, this simply does not work.98 Non-Western 
religious traditions such as Islam, for example, do not make the distinction 
between the domains of the secular and the sacred or, as in the case of Hinduism, 
hierarchically subsume the secular under the sacred.99 Even for Madison and 
Jefferson in the eighteenth century it was precisely because religious duties were 
to be exercised according to conscience, and because belief was not governed by 
the will, that religious liberty was held to be an inalienable right.100 Second, even 
if this objection is accepted, why should only religious exercises of conscience be 
singled out for special protection? 
Similar to the difficulties with Mill’s argument for free speech discussed in 
Part II,101 this argument requires us to accept that the right to freedom of religion 
should be understood (1) in terms of interiorized conscience, and (2) in terms of 
 
 96. Michael Sandel, Religious Liberty: Freedom of Choice or Freedom of Conscience, in SECULARISM 
AND ITS CRITICS 33, 84 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998). 
 97. Andrew Koppelman, No Respect: Brian Leiter on Religion (Northwestern Public Law Research 
Paper No. 10-07, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544484. 
 98. As Sandel suggests, this is especially the case for those who “regard themselves as claimed 
by religious communities they have not chosen” with the result that “[n]ot all religious beliefs can be 
redescribed without loss as ‘the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful.’” Sandel, supra 
note 96, at 85; see also Bhiku Parekh, Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mill to Rawls, 
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 25, 1994, at 11–13 (suggesting that classical liberalism linked 
“diversity to individuality and choice, and valued the former only in so far as it was grounded in the 
individualist conception of man” with the result that it “ruled out several forms of diversity . . . [such 
as] traditional and customary ways of life, as well as those centered on community”). 
 99. T.N. MADAN, MODERN MYTHS, LOCKED MINDS: SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDIA 
15 (1997). 
 100. See ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010), for a recent discussion of the distinction between “autonomy” 
and “conscience.” 
 101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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conscience viewed as “freely chosen.”102 The first proposition is utopian in 
identifying “conscience” as a universal norm or value that all rational people 
should accept and be bound by; the second proposition is apologist for a certain 
Protestant conception of religion. Not only is the first proposition in tension with 
the second, but each also relies on reasons internal to a particular historically- 
and culturally-situated normative tradition. If the right to freedom of religion is 
conceived not solely as protecting autonomy in the form of privatized conscience 
but as encompassing the ascriptive, communal, public, and ethically sensitive 
aspects of religions such as Islam, and if the notion of religious duty is viewed in 
this broader conception as a constitutive end essential to the good and personal 
identity, then the existing contours and shape of the liberal argument collapse 
and the need arises to engage with a genuine conflict of interests internal to the 
right itself. 
Why, for example, should liberal assumptions not now be reversed as many 
representatives of Islamic states have urged and the right peacefully to manifest 
one’s religion be regarded as a dominant normative value? On this view, 
freedom of thought and opinion remains absolutely protected, but manifestations 
of that opinion are now open to limitation to the extent that they incite 
discrimination, hostility, or violence toward religious groups. The fraught task of 
calibrating the respective rights and interests now resumes, for instance, in 
undertaking to draw the line between speech that is “gratuitously offensive” and 
speech that, though offensive, contributes to “any form of public debate capable 
of furthering progress in human affairs.”103 But while the heremeneutic 
difficulties remain, the method and mode of reasoning has shifted. It is now 
respect for the intrinsic value and moral importance of religious belief and 
practice that provides the unspoken background and tacit starting point for the 
ensuing rights discourse. 
Different states in different parts of the world, each with their own unique 
histories and constitutional settlements, continue to struggle with these questions 
and reach different forms of accommodation of the rights claims at issue. The 
critical point, however, is that once the concept of religion is viewed in pluralist, 
as opposed to one-sided Enlightenment-rationalist or Protestant terms, and once 
the collective interests that the right to freedom of religion protects are explicitly 
brought back into the analysis, notions such as “discrimination” and “harm” lose 
the self-assuredness they assume in liberal rights discourse and become once 
again essentially contested concepts within divergent religious and cultural 
nomian spheres.  Such conceptions of value pluralism and the conflicts that 
inevitably arise between fundamental rights have profound implications for any 
mapping of individual toleration whether in domestic or international law.104 
 
 102. See infra text accompanying note 129 for discussion of Locke’s conception of the free and 
unfree conscience. 
 103. This distinction is drawn by the Court in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria. 295 Eur. Ct. H. R. 
49 (ser. A) (1994). Post notes that the distinction between the style and substance of speech is what 
underlies British law on blasphemous libel, which permits anything to be said so long as the 
“decencies of controversy are observed.” Post, supra note 1, at 80. 
 104. See infra Part IV. 
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D. Offense and Harm 
Let us turn to a final objection regarding freedom of religion in this context: 
that contrary to the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria, persons do not have a right not to be insulted in 
their religious beliefs because offense of this kind does not inhibit the right to 
practice a religion.105 In response to the Court’s assertion that a “spirit of 
tolerance” must be a feature of a democratic society, Post has argued that 
“democracy does not require toleration in the sense that persons abandon their 
independent evaluation of the beliefs and ideas of others.”106 
Recall again the distinction between defamation and offense discussed in 
Part II.107 The type of speech at issue in this context is not defamation based on 
denigration of some shared ascriptive characteristics of a group (which would be 
covered by group libel), but rather speech which provocatively aims to cause 
offense, even when “the offense goes to the heart of what . . . [is regarded] as the 
identity of their group.”108 Waldron is thus careful to argue that the specific 
concern about group libel does not include protection of Islam itself or its 
founders: 
The group of all Muslims in society, the group of all followers of Islam, is a 
group of people committed to the one God, to his Prophet, Mohammed, and to 
the holy writings of the Koran. They—the individual Muslims—are entitled to 
protection against defamation, including defamation as Muslims. But that doesn’t 
mean that the Prophet is to be protected against defamation or the creedal beliefs 
of the group. The civic dignity of the members of a group stands separately from 
the status of their beliefs, however offensive an attack upon the Prophet or even 
upon the Koran may seem.109 
As a matter of international law, there is no express provision in human 
rights instruments such as the ICCPR or ECHR stating that individuals or groups 
have a right to be “free from injury to religious feelings.”110 Rather, these words 
have been used in ECHR jurisprudence as the European Court of Human Rights 
has stated that, while religious believers cannot expect to be exempt from all 
criticism and must tolerate the denial by others of their beliefs, the state does 
have a responsibility under Article 9 to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of 
believers’ rights. Thus in Wingrove, the actions of the British government were 
found to be “intended to suppress behavior likely to cause justified indignation 
 
 105. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H. R. 47 (ser. A) (1994) (stating that “in 
extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as 
to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them”). 
 106. Post, supra note 1, at 79–80 (emphasis added). 
 107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 108. Waldron, supra note 24, at 17; RRHA, supra note 35, § 29J (excluding "discussion, criticism or 
expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of their adherents"). 
 109. Waldron, supra note 24, at 17. 
 110.  ICCPR article 19(3) qualifies the right to freedom of expression by providing that the 
exercise of this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities . . . [and] may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions . . . provided by law and . . . necessary . . . [f]or respect of the rights or 
reputations of others.” ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19(3). 
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amongst believing Christians” and as a consequence “intended to protect the 
right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings.”111 
The European Court’s notion of injury to religious feelings appears prima 
facie to run afoul of the distinction between defamation and offense. It is a sacred 
cow of the liberal tradition that causing outrage, moral distress, or offense to 
others does not qualify as harm for the purposes of Mill’s Harm Principle—the 
principle which holds that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”112 The reasons in favor of this proposition are well-
known, the leading amongst which are the indispensability of ethical 
confrontation to the progress of new and better ideas in society and the 
cultivation of a certain open-mindedness in persons.113 
On this basis, provocatively assailing certain ideas, traditions, or symbols even 
(or especially)114 with the intent of causing offense to a group of persons ought to 
be distinguished from defaming or denigrating the group as such—the civic 
dignity of the members of a group stands separately from the status of their 
beliefs no matter how offensive the attack. The defamation/offense distinction 
thus explains the strong reaction in the West against proposals by Islamic states 
to prevent the defamation of religion and prophets. As argued by the 
philosopher Peter Singer, “[w]hile attempts to stir up hatred against adherents of 
a religion, or to incite violence against them, may legitimately be suppressed, 
criticism of religion as such should not be.”115 
There are two observations to make here. First, it is important to note again 
how the belief-action distinction is critical to the logic of this argument. The 
forum internum or internal sphere of personal thought, conscience, or belief of 
speaker and listener alike is absolutely protected from interference by the law, 
i.e. is nonderogable and not subject to limitation by the state. The critique of 
ideas, symbols or traditions—each located on the “value” side of the fact/value 
distinction—is within the sovereignty of this realm and thus inviolable. While 
critique does involve action or manifestation of belief in the form of speech or other 
 
 111. Wingrove v. U.K., 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 53 (1996); see also EVANS, supra note 71. 
 112. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Gateway 1955) (1859). 
 113. JEREMY WALDRON, Mill and The Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 
1981–1991, at 120–23 (1993). 
 114. One philosophical argument made in support of the Danish cartoons was that, despite the 
offense they caused, “it was even a good thing that pious Muslims felt injured, because being hurt by 
criticism might provoke people to re-examine their beliefs–something vital both for democratic 
debate and ethical decision-making.” Asad, supra note 4, at 19. In this respect, “criticism of 
(questionable) religious beliefs is presented as an obligation of free speech, an act carried out in the 
knowledge and power of truth.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Peter Singer, To Defame Religion is a Human Right, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/15/religion-islam-atheism-
defamation; see also International Religious Liberty Association, Statement of Concern about 
Proposals Regarding Defamation of Religions (Sept. 3 2009), http://irla.org/index.php?id=368 
(recognizing that when speech constitutes incitement to violence or discrimination it may be limited 
according to existing international human rights law, but expressing concern that prohibiting the 
“defamation of religions” will not solve the underlying problem of crimes motivated by religious 
hatred but will instead increase religious intolerance and infringe the equally fundamental human 
rights of freedom of expression and religion, which allow for the critique of religious beliefs and 
practices). 
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expression and is thus potentially subject to reasonable limitation in the forum 
externum, it is not seen to interfere with the forum internum of listeners who, while 
potentially offended, insulted, and even threatened by the speech, remain free to 
believe in the tenets of their faith or religious tradition. 
On this conception, we see familiar liberal assumptions at work again: 
speech is understood in terms of autonomy and religion in terms of belief. In the 
modern liberal state, religion is thus imagined as having two dimensions: in so 
far as it involves actual manifestations of belief and actions in the world, it is 
subject to regulation and control by the public (political and legal) spheres; in so 
far as it involves matters of conscience, it is imagined as occupying—in a state of 
inviolable freedom—the private sphere of personal belief, sentiment, and 
identity.116 However this distinction is understood and calibrated in practice, the 
law both constructs and reflects the idea of a legal subject possessing an 
inviolable inner realm of ideas or beliefs separate from one’s actions and “being 
in the world.” 
Second, if we change or adjust the conventional understandings of speech 
and religion underlying this conception, the implications for Mill’s harm 
principle become significantly more complex as the problematic nature of the 
notions of harm and moral injury at work are made visible. Mahmood, for 
example, asks us to consider what constitutes religion and a proper religious 
subjectivity in the modern world? What ethical, communicative, and political 
practices may be necessary to make the kind of injury of religious pain caused by 
the Danish cartoons not mute but intelligible within the liberal calculus of 
rights?117 
For Mahmood, the “modern concept of religion—as a set of propositions in 
a set of beliefs to which the individual gives assent—owes its emergence to the 
rise of Protestant Christianity and its subsequent globalization.”118 The 
distinctions between subject and object, and substance and meaning, are 
distinguishing features of modernity. Religious symbols and icons are one thing; 
sacred figures, with all the devotional respect they might evoke, another. Signs 
and symbols are only arbitrarily linked to the abstractions that human beings 
have come to revere and regard as sacred.119 Muslims offended by the cartoons 
have thus collapsed the necessary distinction between the subject (the divine 
status attributed to Muhammad) with the object (pictorial depictions of 
Muhammad). Their agitation is a “product of a fundamental confusion about the 
materiality of a particular semiotic form that is only arbitrarily, not necessarily, 
linked to the abstract character of their religious beliefs.”120 The critical point for 
Mahmood is that, to the extent religion is 
 
 116. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 205 (1993) (“the constitution of the modern state required the forcible 
redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters 
that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to public) life”). 
 117. Mahmood, supra note 3. 
 118. Id. at 72. 
 119. Religious signs, such as the cross, are thus not “embodiments of the divine but only stand in 
for the divine through an act of human encoding and interpretation.” Id. at 73. 
 120. Id. 
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primarily about belief in a set of propositions to which one lends one’s assent, it 
is fundamentally a matter of choice. Once the truth of such a conception of 
religion, and concomitant subjectivity, is conceded then it follows that wrong-
headed natives and Muslims can perhaps be persuaded to follow a different 
reading practice, one in which images, icons and signs do not have any spiritual 
consequences in and of themselves but are only ascribed such status through a 
set of human conventions . . . . It is this same vision that seems to inform the well 
meaning pleas circulating in Europe today for Muslims to stop taking images 
such as the Danish cartoons so seriously, to realize that the image (of 
Muhammad) can produce no real injury given its true locus is in the interiority of 
the individual believer and not the fickle world of material symbols and signs. 
The hope that a correct reading practice can yield compliant subjects crucially 
depends, in other words, upon a prior agreement about what religion should be 
in the modern world.121 
The moral injury experienced by Muslims from publication of the Danish 
cartoons is intelligible only once one appreciates the relationship of intimacy that 
Muslims have with the Prophet. To see this, however, requires adopting an 
internal perspective on how Muhammad is regarded as a kind of moral exemplar, 
as a “human figure in Islamic doctrine who does not share in divine essence . . . 
[and in this respect] is more an object of veneration than worship.”122 Again, as 
Mahmood so elegantly explains: 
[W]ithin traditions of Muslim piety, a devout Muslim’s relationship to 
Muhammad is predicated not so much on a communicative or representational 
model but an assimilative one wherein one aims to digest Muhammad’s 
personage into oneself as it were. Muhammad, in this understanding, is not 
simply a proper noun referring to a particular historical figure, but the mark of a 
relation of similitude. In this economy of signification, he is a figure of 
immanence in his constant exemplariness, and is therefore not a referential sign 
that stands apart from an essence that it denotes.123 
There is in this sense a “modality of attachment”—a sense of “embodied 
habitation and intimate proximity”—that lies at the heart of the relationship 
between devout Muslims and the Islamic Prophet.124 This has a profound effect 
on how Islam as a religion is lived and practiced, and how certain embodied 
practices and virtues shape the meaning and mode of acquisition of devotion and 
piety.125 Once this embodied and affective nature of the relationship between 
Muslims and the Prophet is made visible, the notion of moral injury caused by 
denigratory or purposively offensive speech no longer falls as neatly into an 
imagined forum internum of private belief or conscience. Rather it suggests a 
 
 121. Id. at 73–74. 
 122. Id. at 75–76. 
 123. Id. at 76. 
 124. See id. 
 125. As Mahmood explains, this includes descriptions of the Prophet’s behavior and “his persona 
and habits understood as exemplars for the constitution of one’s own ethical and affective equipment 
. . . . Such an inhabitation of the model . . . is the result of a labor of love in which one is bound to the 
authorial figure through a sense of intimacy and desire. It is not due to the compulsion of ‘the law’ 
that one emulates the Prophet’s conduct . . . but because of the ethical capacities one has developed.” 
Id. at 78. 
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sense of violation—and violence—that strikes at a Muslim’s very being, a sense of 
wounding against an entire habitus or structure of affect. 
It is not immediately obvious how to fit this notion of harm into either of the 
concepts discussed in this Article of human dignity and freedom of religion. 
Does moral injury of this kind, for example, fall within Waldron’s notion of 
dignity in the sense of basic status and social standing? It seems to me such a 
case is arguable once being Muslim is understood to encompass the kind of 
intimate and affective relationship with Muhammad I have described, and once 
the cartoons are viewed not as defaming a religion in the sense of abstract set of 
beliefs but rather as defaming or rising to the level of stirring up hatred against a 
group of persons as Muslims. 
On the other hand, this kind of affective relationship has more of an 
intimate and personal, as opposed to strictly public, dimension. To the extent 
that dignitarian concerns are related to questions of public order and a well-
ordered society, perhaps this form of moral injury is of a different kind? 
Interestingly, Mahmood suggests that the “sense of moral injury that emanates 
from such a relationship between the ethical subject and the figure of 
exemplarity is quite distinct from the one that blasphemy encodes.”126 To the 
extent then that blasphemy is viewed as a public order offence, the fit within 
extant legal categories is not obvious. 
In the case of freedom of religion, once this right is interpreted in ECHR 
terms as encompassing the collective, public, and sensitive aspects of religious 
communities and traditions,127 then we do face a genuine conflict with the right 
to free speech. These sorts of conflicts are simply irresolvable in the Kantian and 
Rawlsian traditions. As the House of Lords Select Committee discovered in its 
2003 review of English blasphemy laws, there is simply no principled way to 
resolve conflicts not only between, but also internal, to rights themselves other 
than by seeking a form of reconciliation between the particular conceptions of 
the good of different groups in the historical context of particular political 
communities.128 
To do so, however, risks undermining the rationale for rights in the first 
place, i.e. the idea that fundamental rights are independent of the good and thus 
not subject to the potentially unjust demands of public order. Liberal theory can 
resolve such conflicts only by tacitly positing a hierarchy of values or a single 
trumping “covering value” (such as autonomy), or by drawing certain “domain 
restrictions” between spheres of incommensurable values (e.g. between a public 
“secular” and private “religious” sphere) and by then developing theories of 
toleration based on open-textured principles such as “reasonableness.” The shift 
in these justifications from external to internal reasons is again apparent. 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. no. 42571/98 (2005) (upholding a conviction for the 
offense of blasphemy for “an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam” on the basis that “believers may 
legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks”). 
 128. See Danchin, supra note 17, at 311–13. 
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IV.  RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 
A. Liberal and Reflexive Toleration 
In this final Part, I seek to illustrate the implications of the two dialectical 
moves considered in the Article for liberal theories of toleration. Consider John 
Locke’s famous exclusion of atheists and Catholics (and, in the same vein, 
Muslims) from his theory of religious toleration. For Locke, the right to freedom 
of conscience was justified by “the Protestant argument that conscience was 
directly bound to obey and follow God and not men; a theory of the free and at 
the same time unfree conscience (as the ‘work of God’, as Luther had said).”129 
On this basis, there could be no justified claim to the freedom not to believe in 
God,130 nor to believe in a faith that was politically subversive and thus not an 
authentic religious belief.131 The problem with both atheism and Catholicism was 
that the doctrines which flowed from them were suspect because they proceeded 
from wholly subjective and flawed premises. In contrast, while Locke’s Magistrate 
was Christian, this did not affect his ability objectively to interpret either the 
Commonwealth’s civil laws or the universal natural law. 
For Locke, Right Reason or Christian theology, or both, provided the 
necessary justification for his exclusionary positions. Today, however, we see 
distinctly Protestant assumptions at work in each of the arguments above, the 
former relying on a particular substantive account of “free conscience,” the latter 
advancing a philosophical argument based on external reasons that any rational 
person ought to accept simply in virtue of their rationality. In this respect, 
Locke’s arguments appear as subjective and vulnerable to precisely the same 
sorts of criticisms as those he leveled against Roman Catholicism and atheism.132 
While modern liberal theorists such as John Rawls have sought to advance 
secular free-standing theories of public reason and autonomous moral 
personality independent of comprehensive religious views,133 God remained an 
 
 129. Rainer Forst, Toleration and Democracy (unpublished manuscript at 8, on file with author). 
 130. Forst refers to this as “Locke’s fear,” i.e. the concern that without a particular religious basis 
there can be no binding morality and thus no functioning state. Rainer Forst, Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive 
Theory of Toleration, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 92 (Jeremy Waldron & Melissa Williams eds., 
2008). Thus, in A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke states: “those are not to be tolerated who deny the 
Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have 
no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all.” JOHN 
LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 51 (James Tully ed., Hackett Publishing 1985) (1689). 
 131. Locke appears to advance three grounds for the exclusion of Catholics: (1) because certain 
Roman Catholic doctrines bestow legal privileges on Catholics over and above the civil rights of other 
citizens; (2) because such doctrines (as opposed to Catholics themselves or Catholicism as a faith) are 
a “secret Evil” posing a threat on account of the secretive nature of Roman Catholic political practice; 
and (3) because it is not possible in some cases to disaggregate Catholism as a faith from Catholic 
doctrines because they are “absolutely destructive of the society wherein they live” and are premised 
on Vaticanism and loyalty to a foreign power. See Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of 
Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 455 (2008). 
 132. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, The Relevance of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration, 33 
POL. THEORY 678, 680 (2005) (noting that Locke’s theory is either incomplete because it relies on 
religious premises that many people today reasonably reject or inadequate because it relies on 
nonreligious premises regarding belief that fail to provide a valid justification for toleration and 
ultimately rest on religious grounds). 
 133. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
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indispensable transcendent premise in Locke’s late-seventeenth-century thinking 
about natural rights.134 Like the liberal thinkers that would follow him, Locke 
required a non-sectarian but nevertheless deontological argument that could 
define rights and indicate their normative significance.135 While necessary, the 
combination of the premises of free individuals and a neutral order based on the 
consent of those same individuals was on its own insufficient to provide a 
coherent justification of individual liberty. Locke thus advanced a theological 
conception of natural law not related to any particular religion but ascertainable 
through ordinary human reason. While the existence of such a universal natural 
law was rationally discoverable, to later theorists Locke’s natural law positions 
appear both utopian in the form of Judeo-Christian prejudice and apologist in 
justifying restrictions on non-Protestant religious traditions.136 
Let us compare Locke’s liberal argument with the reflexive account of 
religious toleration advanced by the Huguenot philosopher Pierre Bayle.137 For 
Bayle, the primary duty of reason is the mutual justification of any use of religious 
or political force, and thus of toleration while at the same time having good 
reasons to regard one’s own faith or beliefs as true. The critical point here was 
that human reason must recognize its own boundaries and finitude and accept 
the unavoidability of pluralism and reasonable disagreement. On this view, the 
respect owed to others is not on account of a particular ethical conception of the 
good (e.g. that personal autonomy is a precondition for the good life) but rather 
on “a moral notion of the person as a reasonable being with . . . a right to 
justification.”138 This right is “based on the recursive general principle that every 
norm that is to legitimize the use of force (or, more broadly speaking, a morally 
relevant interference with other’s actions) claims to be reciprocally and generally 
valid and therefore needs to be justifiable by reciprocally and generally non-
rejectable reasons.”139 Bayle’s critical insight into the finitude of reason as 
evidenced by Locke’s unreflexive and one-sided theory of toleration is another 
illustration of the shift from external to internal reasons. This shift in perspective 
opens the way for the normative ground for this view: the demanding moral-
political virtue to respect the autonomy of others as reason-giving and reason-
receiving subjects. 
 
 134. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN 
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). 
 135. Waldron has argued that for Locke it was an open question the extent to which non-
Christian or non-monotheistic faiths may provide a basis (through some form of Rawlsian 
overlapping consensus) for a theory of natural rights and human equality. Certainly, while Locke’s 
main concern was with theism per se (i.e. belief in God), his work drew virtually exclusively on Judeo-
Christian sources. Id. 
 136. This is not to say that Locke did not turn his “universalist critique against European customs, 
and conjectures” as well. The point is not that “Locke reflexively invest[ed] the practices of his own 
culture with an aura of moral universalism” or that he was “complicit in a deliberate attempt to 
dehumanize the peoples and practices that the colonists faced in the new world.” Id. at 168. Rather, 
the point is that Locke’s natural law and the doctrines he derived from it no longer appear to us three 
centuries later as either especially natural, objective, or universal. 
 137. See Forst, supra note 130, at 78. 
 138. Forst, supra note 129, at 14. 
 139. Id. 
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B. Two Faces of Religious Toleration 
Locke’s and Bayle’s theories represent two rival philosophies and histories 
of liberal toleration—the former a universal moral ideal seeking rational 
consensus on principles of right and justice that stand apart from conflicts over 
the good, the latter an ethical modus vivendi seeking peaceful coexistence between 
rival ways of life as opposed to a comprehensive moral theory governing all 
ways of life.140 As a political ideal, reflexive toleration is thus a contingent good 
limited by the form of ethical reasoning which gives it its force by drawing upon 
the conflicting values and internal reasons for action of the individuals and 
groups that it seeks to bind. 
In interpreting what the right to religious liberty means today in religiously 
and culturally diverse societies, it is helpful to distinguish between the 
“permission” and “respect” models of toleration. The permission model is a 
relation between an authority (or in a democracy, a majority) and a dissenting, 
different minority or various minorities. On this view, toleration means that “the 
authority (or majority) gives qualified permission to the members of the minority 
to live according to their beliefs on the condition that the minority accepts the 
dominant position of the authority (or majority).”141 By contrast, the respect 
model is a moral view which regards all individuals, whether members of 
majority or minority ethical groups, none of which is favored, as having equal 
legal and political status as guaranteed by a common framework of rights and 
liberties.142 
Each model can in fact adopt either of the rival philosophies of toleration. 
The permission model of toleration (as has shaped most European nation-states) 
may evolve reflexively towards a co-existence conception that seeks, not a 
vertical relationship where a majority stands over minorities in a position of legal 
authority but, a horizontal relationship with groups standing in a relationship of 
coexistence relative to each other, at the same time subjects and objects of 
toleration. A respect model of toleration, however, may reflexively adopt a 
principle of substantive equality that acknowledges that formal equality is 
intolerant towards those religious communities whose beliefs and practices 
require a degree of public presence and collective identity that is both different 
 
 140. See JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM (2000). 
 141. As Forst notes, as long as “the expression of their difference is limited . . . and as long as the 
groups do not claim equal public and political status, they can be tolerated on both pragmatic and 
principled grounds. Rainer Forst, Toleration, Justice and Reason, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN 
DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 73 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003) 
(emphasis added). The origins of the permission conception can be traced to the 1598 Edict of Nantes 
in late sixteenth century France and to the later Toleration Act of 1689 in England. Both of these 
regimes of toleration involved complex matrices of freedom and domination and of inclusion and 
exclusion as the majority granted to minorities the liberty, but not the equal right, to practice their 
religion and participate in public life. See Rainer Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, in RECOGNITION 
AND POWER 215, 215–16 (Bert Van Den Brink & David Owens eds., 2007). 
 142. The history of the respect conception is traced by Forst to the struggle of Protestant provinces 
in the north of the Netherlands against Spanish rule and the enforcement of Catholicism in the 
sixteenth century, and to the later English Civil War and Protestant arguments for conscience being 
bound to obey and follow God and not men. See Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, supra note 141, at 
223. 
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from the majority cultural form and unable to accommodate the public/private 
distinction.143 
A respect model of toleration may conversely adopt a formal notion of 
liberal equality in which, although all citizens have equal rights, cultural and 
religious differences are confined to the “private” sphere on the basis of a 
public/private distinction. This model is reflected in the laicité of French 
republicanism and in the Rawlsian priority of the right (equal basic liberties) 
over the good. In contrast, a permission model may continue to exist within the 
framework of a modern liberal democracy. As in the case of speech inciting 
religious hatred in the United Kingdom, a majority may continue to rely on a 
permission conception notwithstanding the need to justify it under a scheme of 
basic equal liberties of all citizens. 
What is decisive then is not the model of toleration that exists in a state, but 
rather the philosophy and mode of reasoning that underpins and justifies its 
normative application and development. The argument advanced in this Article 
suggests that Bayle’s reflexive philosophy as applied to the respect model of 
toleration is superior to the alternatives. The difficulty, however, is how to apply 
this conception in practice. Is it the claims of the editors of Jyllands-Posten or 
those of offended Muslims, for example, that are more reciprocally or generally 
valid? The criteria of reciprocity and generality arguably function in much the 
same way, and face the same disabling indeterminacies, as the concepts of 
neutrality and general applicability in liberal theory. The outcome in practice 
therefore is likely to be a gradual shift towards the permission model, albeit in its 
liberal democratic form. Nevertheless, as Forst concludes, reflexive toleration is 
the 
attitude of those who are willing to engage in such arguments, who accept the 
criteria of reciprocity and generality, and who accept in a given case that their 
arguments do not suffice to be the basis of general law. Still, given . . . justified 
doubts, it is important to add another reason for toleration connected to this: the 
toleration of those who see that a debate remains in a standstill and that therefore 
no side can show its claims and reasons to be superior. In such a case, toleration 
means to accept that other grounds for the regulation of a conflict have to be 
found, by way of compromise.144 
C. Democratic Theory and Political Legitimacy 
There is one final objection levied against the enactment of hate speech or 
group libel laws that needs to be addressed. Robert Post145 and Ronald 
Dworkin146 have argued that, beyond the link between free expression and the 
flourishing of democratic self-government, free speech is the price we pay for 
political legitimacy. “‘The majority has no right to impose its will on someone who 
 
 143. See, e.g., ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI, TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION 126 (2002) (suggesting 
that the idea of liberal neutrality should not be abandoned but rather reinterpreted so that public 
recognition of minoritarian differences is itself regarded as form of neutrality and impartiality). 
 144. Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, supra note 141, at n.32. 
 145. See Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 
(1991). 
 146. See Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v–ix (Ivan Hare & 
James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
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is forbidden to raise a voice in protest . . . before the decision is taken.’ If we want 
legitimate laws against violence or discrimination, we must let their opponents 
speak. And then we can legitimize those laws by voting.”147 On this basis, no 
matter how extreme or vicious the speech of opponents of anti-discrimination 
laws may be, that speech must be allowed in order to legitimate other laws that 
prohibit violence or discrimination. 
Accepting the fact that hate speech laws do impose restrictions on speech on 
account of its content,148 there clearly are differences of degree in the ways such 
speech may insult, humiliate, or intimidate groups of people. Most hate speech 
laws are carefully crafted to allow the propositional content of views to be 
expressed in such a way that they become subject to suppression only when 
expressed in vicious or vituperative terms intended to stir up hatred through 
attacking the basic social standing and elementary dignity of vulnerable 
groups.149 While these are always difficult, and at times elusive, lines to draw 
and involve the balancing of divergent values and making of contested value 
judgments, both Post’s and Dworkin’s objections on the grounds of democratic 
theory and political legitimacy are answerable. As we have seen, the vast 
majority of advanced democracies have enacted such laws without visibly 
diminishing the legitimacy of their various anti-discrimination laws. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Serious consideration of how the American legal system should engage 
with Islamic norms and the claims of Muslim communities has only just begun. 
The public sphere of a liberal democracy such as the United States cannot 
accommodate all Islamic claims and sensibilities. The specific question addressed 
in this Article has been whether Muslim communities should be guaranteed 
protection from incitement to religious hatred as a matter of human dignity, or 
freedom of religion, or both. The scope and terms of engagement and the mode 
of deliberation under which the encounter between liberal theory and Islamic 
norms occurs will be determinative of how this question is ultimately addressed. 
We have seen that liberal rights and the K each guarantee freedom of 
religion and freedom of thought. But they do so in different ways and for 
different reasons. The Lockean notion of religious belief as the simultaneously 
free and unfree will is quite distinct from the Islamic notion of religious belonging 
understood as a particular way of life where the individual does not own herself. 
Blasphemy, in this sense, is less concerned with belief or disbelief as with 
violently disrupting a living relationship. Viewing the Danish cartoon 
controversy solely through the lens of liberal theory masks the contingency and 
particularity of the normative assumptions upon which this theory rests and 
avoids an engagement with the internal point of view of a distinct normative 
 
 147. Waldron, supra note 49, at 4 (restating Dworkin’s account of political legitimacy). 
 148. Waldron notes that other countries do not subscribe to the doctrine that an exception to free 
speech may not be based on the content of what is said or published and describes First Amendment 
jurisprudence as having “gone down a blind alley” in this area and being an example of “path-
dependency.” Id. at 19. Hate speech and group libel laws thus directly confront two of the main 
justifications for the content-based restriction doctrine, i.e. the market place of ideas and suspicion of 
majoritarian government rationales. Id. at 2–3. 
 149. Id. at 9–10. 
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system with its own hierarchies, disputes over interpretation, and standards of 
rational justification. On this approach, there is no dialogue, no search for 
possible forms of coexistence, reconciliation or overlapping consensus; there is 
only a dialogue of the deaf and a one-sided assertion of right. 
By contrast, we need to consider what it may mean for a Muslim 
community to practice and maintain its religion in the conditions of 
contemporary European or North American society. What obstacles might such 
communities face? The degree to which rights to dignity and religious freedom 
may enable the practice of Islam as a religion and way of life free from visible 
manifestations of hate and incitement to religious hatred are essentially-
contested but increasingly important questions. If all we see in the normative 
claims of Muslims are threats to freedom, however, the debate will remain at its 
current impasse. 
 
